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Abstract
It is well known that speaker verification systems are subject to
spoofing attacks. The Automatic Speaker Verification Spoofing
and Countermeasures Challenge – ASVSpoof2015 – provides
a standard spoofing database, containing attacks based on syn-
thetic speech, along with a protocol for experiments. This pa-
per describes CPqD’s systems submitted to the ASVSpoof2015
Challenge, based on deep neural networks, working both as a
classifier and as a feature extraction module for a GMM and
a SVM classifier. Results show the validity of this approach,
achieving less than 0.5% EER for known attacks.
Index Terms: Speaker Verification, Spoofing Countermea-
sures, Deep Neural Networks
1. Introduction
Biometric spoofing is usually described as a direct attack per-
petrated against a biometric authentication system by present-
ing it a fake (forged or copied) biometric sample. Anti-spoofing
refers, therefore, to countermeasures designed to detect and pre-
vent these attacks [1].
In the last few years, many studies have shown that even
state-of-the-art automatic speaker verification (ASV) systems
are vulnerable to such attacks, which can be based on a vari-
ety of techniques, including voice conversion, speech synthe-
sis, artificial signals, impersonation, and replay [1]. Although
most of these studies proposes countermeasures too, they usu-
ally are based on prior knowledge about the attack method, what
is clearly unrepresentative of real world scenarios. Additionally,
each one is also based on its own database, protocol and met-
rics, making it difficult to perform a proper analysis of results
and restricting fair comparison among them [2].
The recent Automatic Speaker Verification Spoofing and
Countermeasures Challenge, ASVSpoof20151, which focused
on spoofing attacks based on synthetic speech, provided the
first standard spoofing database along with a protocol for ex-
periments. Differently from previous works, 10 different voice
conversion and speech synthesis algorithms were used to gener-
ate the database, but only 5 of them were known in advance in
order to train spoofing detection algorithms [3]. This paper de-
scribes the systems based on neural networks submitted to the
challenge and analyze the obtained results.
Deep Neural Networks (DNN) have been widely used in
a variety of research fields, such as image classification [4, 5],
natural language processing [6] and information retrieval [7].
In the speech processing community, DNN have been applied
to speech recognition [8], speech synthesis [9, 10] and also to
speaker recognition [11, 12].
1http://www.spoofingchallenge.org/
One straightforward application of a DNN for spoofing de-
tection is to use it as a classifier, whose input data can be either
raw audio [13] or features previously extracted from the audio
files. A natural choice for audio pre-processing is to use features
proven to yield good results in speaker recognition and spoof-
ing detection tasks, such as traditional Mel Frequency Cepstral
Coefficients (MFCC) [14] and Modified Group Delay Cepstral
Coefficients (MGDCC) [15], which have been broadly used not
only in combination with neural networks, but also with a hand-
ful of other classification algorithms.
In problems like spoofing detection, a DNN can also be em-
ployed as a feature extraction module itself, by means of a bot-
tleneck approach [16]. In this case, a network, initially trained
for regression or classification, has its final layers removed, and
the output of its last remaining layer is used as a new representa-
tion of the input data for future classification [13]. The network
can receive as input a pre-processed feature vector, a high-level
full representation of the signal (using, for instance, the Fast
Fourier transform) or even the raw audio. In this work, we used
the high-level representation approach, as described in Section
3.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a brief
description of neural networks. Section 3 explains the methods
applied. Section 4 presents and discusses results obtained on
the ASVspoof2015 challenge. Finally, Section 5 draw some
conclusions, as well as points to topics for future research.
2. Neural Networks
The submitted systems are based on a Deep Learning approach.
A deep neural network (DNN) is an artificial neural network
with more than one hidden neuronal layer between its inputs
and outputs [17]. The DNN concept can be implemented us-
ing many different architectures, such as Convolutional Neural
Networks (CNN) [18], Autoencoders [19], and Multilayer Per-
ceptrons (MLP) [20].
In a Multilayer Perceptron, tipically, each neuron j in a hid-
den layer l employs a sigmoid function, such as the logistic
function or hyperbolic tangent, to map the total input xlj , re-
ceived from the layer l − 1, to an output ylj , that is sent to the
following layer, l + 1.
xlj = b
l
j +
∑
1≤i≤Nl−1
wli,jy
l−1
i (1)
ylj = logistic(x
l
j) (2)
where N l−1 is the number of neurons in layer l − 1, yl−1i is
the output of neuron i on previous layer, wli,j is the connection
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weight between neuron i from layer l − 1 and neuron j from
layer l, and blj is the bias of neuron j of the current layer [17].
One of the major DNN applications is for multiclass classi-
fication problems. In this context, a softmax nonlinear function
can be used in the network output layer to convert inputs xoutj ,
into a class probability, pj :
pj =
exp(xoutj )∑
1≤k≤Nout exp(x
out
k )
(3)
whereNout is the number of neurons in the output layer, which
is equal to the number of possible classes. In this case, the
network output pj will indicate the likelihood of the input fed
to the network belonging to the j-th class [17].
3. Method
3.1. Feature Extraction
Aiming at detecting if an audio is authentic or not, a deep neu-
ral network based on a multilayer perceptron architecture was
used as a feature extraction module. In a bottleneck approach,
the network output layer is removed and the activations of the
last hidden layer neurons are treated as new features for future
classification. Figure 1 shows how audio was processed, from
feature extraction to network supervised training.
Instead of feeding raw signal directly as input to the net-
work, a pre-processing step was performed in order to trans-
form input signals into sequences of feature vectors. This de-
cision was based on preliminary tests, which indicated such a
step was able to improve the learning rate and allowed the use
of more compact networks. Therefore, each signal file is di-
vided into a sequence of 20 ms consecutive non-overlapping
frames. No window function is applied. In parallel, a voice ac-
tivity detection method based on ITU G.729B [21] is applied, so
each frame is classified as speech/non-speech and only speech
frames are preserved.
Different representations were tested as input for the MLP,
including the raw speech frame itself, MFCC, MGDCC and
Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) coefficients. Nevertheless,
better results were achieved with the Discrete Cosine Trans-
form (DCT) coefficients. The DCT has the energy compaction
property, which concentrates most of the signal information in
a few low-frequency components [22]. For this reason, the first
128 DCT coefficients are used as feature for each active speech
frame.
In order to avoid loss of long term information that can pos-
sibly be used to distinguish spoofing attacks, when an input is
presented to the MLP, each central speech frame is surrounded
by its ten previous frames and the ten following ones, including
silence frames [11]. Thus, a vector with 2688 features is used
as network input.
The backpropagation algorithm, in conjunction with the
Stochastic Gradient Descent optimization technique [20], was
applied to train the network to classify whether the input rep-
resents an authentic (human) or spoofed audio frame. Ground
truth consists of a label indicating if the input audio is authentic
or belongs to one of five spoofing categories, named S1, S2, S3,
S4 or S5 [2].
Preliminary experiments indicated that using only two
classes – spoofing and human – as output led to poor perfo-
mance in class S1. One hypothesis is that this could happen
because S1 distinguishes from other attacks since it is based
on a unit selection algorithm, which concatenates pieces of au-
thentic signal to create a new audio. To deal with this, it was
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Figure 1: Basic flowchart used for spoofing detection
decided to drive the network training towards distinguishing S1
from the other spoofing attacks, increasing the relevance (on
network performance) of detecting borders between pieces of
authentic speech. Thus, three classes were created, as depicted
in Table 1: authentic human speech (100), S1 spoofing attack
(010) and other spoofing attacks (001).
Figure 2 shows the MLP deep architecture used in this pa-
per. 1024 neurons were used in the first hidden layer, 512 in
the second hidden layer and 32 in the last one. The last hidden
layer is artificially small in order to create a bottleneck, which
compress signal information useful for spoofing classification
in a low-dimensional representation [16]. Each hidden layer
uses the logistic function as activation. The output consists of 3
neurons, each one with softmax activation function, returning a
real number between 0 and 1. After finishing the network train-
ing, the output layer was removed and the activations of the last
hidden layer neurons were used as new output, extracting the
bottleneck features, as indicated in Figure 2.
Table 1: MLP classes output meanings.
y0 y1 y2 Meaning
1 0 0 human
0 1 0 S1 attack
0 0 1 S2, S3, S4, S5attacks
1 2 210 
1 2 29 
1 2 25 
… 
… 
… 
1 2 3 
… 
x0 x1 x2668 
y0 y1 y2 
bottleneck  
features 
Figure 2: MLP used for feature extraction and classification
3.2. Classification
Three different classifiers were tested: Support Vector Ma-
chines (SVM), Gaussian Mixture Models (GMM) and Multi-
layer Perceptron. In the cases of the SVM and the GMM clas-
sifiers, feature extraction took an additional step. Since each
audio file has a different duration and, thus, a different number
of frames, feature vectors over all frames were averaged so that
each file was represented by a single fixed-size 32-dimensional
feature vector [23].
A SVM classifier [24] based on the Radial Basis Function
(RBF) kernel was generated. Samples from the training set were
computed and used to train the SVM-RBF. All spoofing attacks
were considered as a single negative class for training.
The SVM-RBF classifier parameters C (controls the cost
of misclassification on the training data) and γ (parameter of a
Gaussian kernel to handle nonlinear classification) were tuned
by performing grid search with K-fold cross-validation over the
train set, using 5 folds. Values of 0.001, 0.01, 0.1, 1.0, 10.0,
100.0, 1000.0 and 10000.0 were searched both for C and γ.
Optimum parameters were chosen aiming at minimizing the av-
erage equal error rate (EER) over all 5 folds. After this search,
optimum values of C = 0.1 and γ = 10 were found and the
SVM-RBF classifier was retrained with the whole training set.
SVM-RBF outputs vary in the interval [0.0, 1.0] and represent
the likelihood of the test sample belonging to positive class, i.e.,
authentic speech audio.
For the GMM based classifier, two GMMs were trained,
one with authentic audios and another with spoofed audios. The
following number of Gaussian mixtures were tested: 4, 8, 32,
64, 128, 256 and 512, wherein 8 mixtures gave the lowest EER
on the development set. The classifier output is given by the
log-likelihood ratio of authentic GMM with respect to spoofing
GMM.
Figure 3 shows the log-likelihood ratio (score) distribution
obtained on the development set when a 8-mixture GMM was
employed to classify the bottleneck features. Score values vary
in the interval [−∞,+∞] and the higher the value, the higher
the probability of the tested sample being authentic. The figure
clearly shows this strategy provided a good separation over the
develpment set. A similar behavior was verified for the SVM-
RBF classifier.
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Figure 3: Scores distribution for spoofing (green) and authentic
(blue) audios on the development set when using a GMM with
8 gaussians and bottleneck features
The third and last tested approach consisted of using the
MLP trained for feature extraction directly as a classifier, with-
out the removal of the output layer. In this case, the feature
extraction was merged with the classification step.
As the network last layer returns three values using the soft-
max function, according to presented in Figure 2, only y0 is
considered, since it represents the likelihood of being an au-
thentic speech. Thus, values for this third approach vary in the
interval [0.0, 1.0]. A score (y0) was then calculated for each
frame in the audio file, generating a score array for the entire
audio. This array was used to compute a unique score for the
audio sample. To do so, aiming at removing outliers within the
audio file, the first 15% lower array values are removed as well
as the 25% higher values. The remaining 60% of the scores
were then averaged, resulting in the final score.
These three aproaches were, then, applied to the evaluation
set, which contained samples comprising both known and un-
known attacks. Results are presented in the next section.
4. Results and Analysis
Results obtained for the three tested systems are summarized
in Table 2. According to challenge rules, the adopted metric
is the EER. For more details on what that means and how it is
calculated, please refer to the contest evaluation plan [3].
It can be seen that:
• the SVM-RBF classifier showed the best performance
Table 2: EER results (%) obtained on development set and on
evaluation set for known and unknown attacks.
Classifier Dev Set Known Unknown All
SVM 0.491 0.412 13.026 6.719
GMM 0.658 0.443 12.796 6.620
MLP 0.631 0.464 12.589 6.527
for known attacks, while the unknown attacks were bet-
ter detected by the MLP classifier. However, EER values
are very close, which means that the choice of the classi-
fier is less determinant for the overall performance than
the feature extraction mechanism itself.
• all three systems performed very well for the known at-
tacks, which shows that the network was successfull in
capturing the pattern of attacks learned during training.
• most of the unknown attacks were correctly detected;
however a clear degradation of performance can be ob-
served when error rates of known and unknown attacks
are contrasted.
• when considering only the five unknown attacks discrim-
inated by method used (these results are not shown here
due to space reasons), the proposed method obtained
good results (EER near to 1%) in three of them. Re-
sults for attacks S8 (a tensor-based voice conversion) and
S10 (a speech synthesis algorithm implemented using
the open source MaryTTS system), however, indicate a
poor performance, with EERs of 26.8% and 31.7%, re-
spectively.
One hypothesis for the degradation observed in classifiers’
performances for evaluation set is the occurence of overfitting to
noise present in training samples. This situation can be verified
by the existence of a significant difference in error rates even
when training and testing samples are drawn from the same dis-
tribution. That is not what the results presented here show, since
performance in the development set is close to the performance
for known attacks in evaluation set.
The second hypothesis is lack of generalization capacity,
which means that some of the distinctive features learned by the
network and the classifiers are not related to what distinguishes
an authentic recording from spoofing attacks in general, but are
rather due to patterns only observed in the known attack sam-
ples, i.e., specific characteristics of synthesis and conversion al-
gorithms used during training step.
It was also verified after the submission that many spoofing
audios available on the training and development sets present
descontinuity in low frequency noise, mainly in the range 0
to 100 Hz. Figure 4 shows the problem. In this case, as 128
DCT coefficients was used as DNN input, the first coefficients
will indicate this discontinuity and the network will learn this
characteristic as a relevant feature to distinguish authentic from
spoofing audios, degrading the network’s generalization capac-
ity when audios without this discontinuity are presented.
Even though some degradation of performance is expected,
the results obtained show that there is room for improvements,
since the nature of unknown attacks is not inherently different
from that of the known ones.
5. Conclusions
The study presented here comprises the results obtained, along
with the description of the systems implemented by CPqD for
Figure 4: Low frequency noise discontinuity available on train-
ing and development set (0 to 1000 Hz in vertical axis)
the Automatic Speaker Verification Spoofing and Countermea-
sures Challenge (ASVSpoof2015), held as a special session in
INTERSPEECH 2015. The main goal of the challenge was the
detection of spoofing attacks based on sinthesized and trans-
formed speech.
A speech feature extraction framework based on deep neu-
ral networks for spoofing detection is presented. The network
can be used as a classifier itself or can be viewed as a bottle-
neck feature extractor feeding other classifiers. Two different
classifiers were tested: a Gaussian Mixture Model and a Sup-
port Vector Machine with the radial basis function.
The proposed systems were trained with the training set and
tested on two different evaluation sets: one with attacks similar
to those presented during training and another with unknown
attacks, just as described in the evaluation plan.
The use of a DNN as a feature extractor is of particular
interest, as the generated features are fine-tuned to provide a
good representation specifically for the problem to be solved, be
it spoofing detection, speaker/speech recognition or other tasks.
However, these features are highly dependent on the training
samples and they can learn any bias present in this set. Thus
the careful design of large and diverse datasets is even more
relevant when using this kind of feature.
Performance for the known attacks was satisfactory
(EER < 0.5%), indicating the adequacy of the proposed
strategies. Results obtained for the unknown attacks were also
promising. For some of the new attacks, however, the detection
strategy had poor performance. This could be easily overcome
with training data composed by samples generated by a more di-
verse attack techniques. In addition to an improved training set,
the use of alternative forms of parametrization of the input au-
dio in the neural network could be beneficial. Representations
that make the speech phase spectrum more evident are specially
interesting, as the use of such information proved to be highly
successful in literature for spoofing detection [15].
Lastly, in future work, other network architectures, like
Convolutional Neural Networks, should be tested in order to
study which of them is able to provide better detection of un-
known attacks, an ability extremely relevant in real-world appli-
cations, as rarely the techniques used by fraudsters for identity
theft are known in advance.
6. Acknowledgements
We would like to gratefully thank MSc Christopher Dane
Shulby for this paper review and helpful comments.
7. References
[1] N. Evans, T. Kinnunen, and J. Yamagishi, “Spoofing and counter-
measures for automatic speaker verification.” in INTERSPEECH,
2013, pp. 925–929.
[2] Z. Wu, T. Kinnunen, N. Evans, J. Yamagishi, C. Hanilc¸i,
M. Sahidullah, and A. Sizov, “Asvspoof 2015: the first auto-
matic speaker verification spoofing and countermeasures chal-
lenge,” in INTERSPEECH 2015 – 16th Annual Conference of the
International Speech Communication Association, September 6–
10, Dresden, Germany, Proceedings, 2015, p. Submitted.
[3] Z. Wu, T. Kinnunen, N. Evans, and J. Yamagishi, “Asvspoof
2015: Automatic speaker verification spoofing and countermea-
sures challenge evaluation plan,” Training, vol. 10, no. 15, p.
3750, 2014.
[4] K. He, X. Zhang, S. Ren, and J. Sun, “Delving deep into rectifiers:
Surpassing human-level performance on imagenet classification,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:1502.01852, 2015.
[5] S. Ioffe and C. Szegedy, “Batch normalization: Accelerating
deep network training by reducing internal covariate shift,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1502.03167, 2015.
[6] R. Collobert and J. Weston, “A unified architecture for natural lan-
guage processing: Deep neural networks with multitask learning,”
in International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML), 2008,
pp. 160–167.
[7] P. Huang, X. He, J. Gao, L. Deng, A. Acero, and L. Heck, “Learn-
ing deep structured semantic models for web search using click-
through data,” in Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
International Conference Information and Knowledge Manage-
ment (CIKM), 2013.
[8] G. Dahl, D. Yu, L. Deng, and A. Acero, “Context-dependent pre-
trained deep neural networks for large-vocabulary speech recog-
nition,” vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 30–42, 2012.
[9] H. Zen, A. Senior, and M. Schuster, “Statistical parametric speech
synthesis using deep neural networks,” in Acoustics, Speech and
Signal Processing (ICASSP), 2013 IEEE International Confer-
ence on. IEEE, 2013, pp. 8012–8016.
[10] S. Kang, X. Qian, and H. Meng, “Multi-distribution deep belief
network for speech synthesis,” in Acoustics, Speech and Signal
Processing (ICASSP), 2013 IEEE International Conference on.
IEEE, 2013, pp. 7962–7966.
[11] E. Variani, X. Lei, E. McDermott, I. L. Moreno, and J. Gonzalez-
Dominguez, “Deep neural networks for small footprint text-
dependent speaker verification,” in Acoustics, Speech and Signal
Processing (ICASSP), 2014 IEEE International Conference on.
IEEE, 2014, pp. 4052–4056.
[12] Y. Lei, N. Scheffer, L. Ferrer, and M. McLaren, “A novel scheme
for speaker recognition using a phonetically-aware deep neural
network,” in Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP),
2014 IEEE International Conference on. IEEE, 2014, pp. 1695–
1699.
[13] H. Lee, P. Pham, Y. Largman, and A. Y. Ng, “Unsupervised fea-
ture learning for audio classification using convolutional deep be-
lief networks,” in Advances in neural information processing sys-
tems, 2009, pp. 1096–1104.
[14] S. Davis and P. Mermelstein, “Comparison of parametric repre-
sentations for monosyllabic word recognition in continuously spo-
ken sentences,” Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing, IEEE
Transactions on, vol. 28, no. 4, pp. 357–366, 1980.
[15] Z. Wu, X. Xiao, E. S. Chng, and H. Li, “Synthetic speech de-
tection using temporal modulation feature,” in Acoustics, Speech
and Signal Processing (ICASSP), 2013 IEEE International Con-
ference on. IEEE, 2013, pp. 7234–7238.
[16] D. Yu and M. L. Seltzer, “Improved bottleneck features using pre-
trained deep neural networks.” in INTERSPEECH, vol. 237, 2011,
p. 240.
[17] G. Hinton, L. Deng, D. Yu, G. E. Dahl, A.-r. Mohamed, N. Jaitly,
A. Senior, V. Vanhoucke, P. Nguyen, T. N. Sainath et al., “Deep
neural networks for acoustic modeling in speech recognition: The
shared views of four research groups,” Signal Processing Maga-
zine, IEEE, vol. 29, no. 6, pp. 82–97, 2012.
[18] O. Abdel-Hamid, L. Deng, and D. Yu, “Exploring convolutional
neural network structures and optimization techniques for speech
recognition.” in INTERSPEECH, 2013, pp. 3366–3370.
[19] P. Vincent, H. Larochelle, I. Lajoie, Y. Bengio, and P.-A.
Manzagol, “Stacked denoising autoencoders: Learning useful
representations in a deep network with a local denoising
criterion,” J. Mach. Learn. Res., vol. 11, pp. 3371–3408,
Dec. 2010. [Online]. Available: http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?
id=1756006.1953039
[20] S. O. Haykin, Neural networks and learning machines. Pearson
Education Upper Saddle River, 2009, vol. 3.
[21] A. Benyassine, E. Shlomot, H.-Y. Su, D. Massaloux, C. Lamblin,
and J.-P. Petit, “Itu-t recommendation g. 729 annex b: a silence
compression scheme for use with g. 729 optimized for v. 70 dig-
ital simultaneous voice and data applications,” Communications
Magazine, IEEE, vol. 35, no. 9, pp. 64–73, 1997.
[22] N. Ahmed, T. Natarajan, and K. R. Rao, “Discrete cosine trans-
form,” Computers, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 100, no. 1, pp. 90–
93, 1974.
[23] M. J. R. F. Correia, “Anti-spoofing: Speaker verification vs. voice
conversion,” Master’s thesis, Instituto Superior Te´cnico Lisboa,
2014.
[24] C. Cortes and V. Vapnik, “Support-vector networks,” Machine
Learning, vol. 20, no. 3, pp. 273–297, 1995. [Online]. Available:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00994018
